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SWEATY SUBURBS: CAN STATES AND 
WORKER CENTERS WASH THEM CLEAN? 
Kate S. Woodall*
SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS. 
By Jennifer Gordon. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press 2005. 
Abstract: In Suburban Sweatshops, Jennifer Gordon paints a bleak picture of 
the current state of undocumented workers’ rights in suburban America’s 
service industry. As immigration law is increasingly interpreted to limit the 
rights of undocumented workers, undocumented immigrants are having a 
harder time organizing to demand workplace rights. In the face of this in-
creasing exploitation, however, Gordon ªnds hope in alternatives to the 
traditional union structure. She focuses on the efforts of the Workplace 
Project, a Long Island worker center, to advocate for immigrant workers 
through participation in the political process and geographic organiza-
tion. This Book Review examines the legal framework in which suburban 
sweatshops thrive and explores the effectiveness of alternative organizing 
groups, such as the Workplace Project, in effecting change for undocu-
mented workers. Through the political process and geographic organiza-
tion, worker centers around the nation have met with limited success in 
combating the abuse of undocumented immigrant workers. 
Introduction 
 Jorge Bonilla was hospitalized with pneumonia after sleep-
ing all winter on tablecloths mounded on the ºoor of the 
Long Island restaurant where we worked, the heat capped at 
50˚. He had been evicted from the room where he had been 
living because his wage of 30¢ an hour was so low that he 
could not pay his rent, even working 80 hours a week. 
 As a live-in domestic worker, Yanira Juarez cared for two 
children and cleaned house in Suffolk County. Duped by her 
employer’s claim that her wages were being paid “into a sav-
ings account,” she worked for 6 months with no pay, and 
then was ªred without seeing a penny.1
                                                   
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2005–2006). 
1 Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights 2 
(2005). “This book has its roots in grim sweatshop stories like these. But it also has an un-
expected tale to tell.” Id. at 3. 
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 In Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights, Jennifer 
Gordon examines the pervasive problem of sweatshop working condi-
tions in the service industries of America’s suburbs.2 Employers of 
restaurant workers, domestic workers, janitors, and day laborers rou-
tinely cheat employees out of their wages, require workers to work 
long hours, fail to pay employees overtime, and pay workers well be-
low the minimum wage.3 Complicating matters, most of the workers 
in current suburban sweatshops throughout the United States are 
immigrants who face obstacles such as their undocumented or non-
citizen status, language and cultural barriers, and an increasingly hos-
tile government stance on immigration.4 Many undocumented immi-
grants are unaware of their rights and are afraid to learn about them 
for fear of being deported.5 Thus, they do not demand the legal pro-
tections to which they are entitled.6
 The meager protections offered to undocumented workers by 
federal law create a fertile soil for exploitation.7 First, the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) used employment re-
strictions as a way to enforce stricter immigration control.8 The IRCA 
                                                   
2 See id. at 13–14 (discussing new kinds of emerging sweatshops). 
3 Id. at 15, 21–22; see, e.g., Tisha R. Tallman, Liberty, Justice, & Equality: An Examination 
of Past, Present, & Proposed Immigration Policy Reform Legislation, 30 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. 
Reg. 869, 871 (2005) (stating that “approximately two-thirds of undocumented workers 
earn less than two times the minimum wage”); Michael J. Wishnie, The Border Crossed Us: 
Current Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 389, 389 (2004) (assert-
ing that “[i]t is well known that many immigrants in this country labor for long hours for 
illegally low pay in perilous working conditions”). 
4 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 46, 51 (referring to the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the National Labor Relations Act in Hoffman Plastics v. NLRB as a major setback for im-
migrant workers); Rebecca Smith & Amy Sugimori, Low Pay, High Risk: State Models 
for Advancing Immigrant Workers’ Rights 8 (2003), available at http://www.nelp.org/ 
iwp/reform/state/low_pay_high_risk.cfm (arguing that immigrant workers are “under 
attack from many fronts,” including recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal 
law); Tallman, supra note 3, at 872–73 (remarking that “[c]urrent U.S. immigration policy 
is broken” because it punishes immigrant workers). 
5 Gordon, supra note 1, at 6–7; see Wishnie, supra note 3, at 398 (“[E]mployers fre-
quently seek to control their non-citizen workers by threatening them with deportation.”). 
6 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 6–7 (stating that many undocumented workers submit 
to illegal working conditions out of fear of losing their jobs). 
7 Janice Fine, Neighborhood Funders Group, Worker Centers: Organizing 
Communities at the Edge of the Dream 8 (2005), available at http://www.nfg.org/pub- 
lications/worker_centers_with_cover.pdf. In an effort to explain the exploitation faced by 
low-wage immigrant workers, Dr. Fine describes their condition as the result of “a ‘perfect 
storm.’ It is a storm resulting from labor laws that have ceased to protect workers, little 
effective labor market regulation of new economic structures and a national immigration 
policy that has created a permanent underclass of low-wage workers.” Id. 
8 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)–(2) (1988); 
Dennise A. Calderon-Barrera, Note, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving Undocumented Workers Un-
protected Under United States Labor Laws?, 6 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 119, 120 (2003). Calderon-
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aimed to decrease the number of undocumented aliens in the United 
States by making it illegal for employers to knowingly employ un-
documented immigrants.9 This focus on reducing the number of un-
documented immigrants in the American work force has created an 
atmosphere of fear of deportation that makes it difªcult for undocu-
mented immigrants to demand their rights.10 Second, the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which protects workers’ rights to organ-
ize, does not adequately protect undocumented workers.11 While un-
documented workers are considered “employees” for the purposes of 
                                                                                                                      
Barrera explains that Congress tried to decrease the demand for undocumented workers 
by punishing employers who hired undocumented immigrants. Calderon-Barrera, supra, at 
120. In decreasing the undocumented immigrant labor market, they hoped to simultane-
ously diminish the attractiveness of immigrating to the United States to work. Id. 
9 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)–(2) (“(a)(1) In general—It is unlawful for a person or other 
entity— (A) to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an 
alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien (as deªned in subsection (h)(3) of this 
section) with respect to such employment.”); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the 
Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
345, 355–56 (2001). President Ronald Reagan noted that: 
[I]n the past 35 years our nation has been increasingly affected by illegal im-
migration. This legislation takes a major step toward meeting this challenge 
to our sovereignty. . . . The employer sanctions program is the keystone and 
major element. It will remove the incentive for illegal immigration by elimi-
nating the job opportunities which draw illegal aliens here. 
Statement by President Ronald Reagan Upon Signing S. 1200, 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. 
Doc. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1986). 
10 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 113 (explaining that workers who wished to be involved 
with the Workplace project had to ªrst conquer their fear of being deported if they de-
manded their rights from an employer); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocu-
mented Workers, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 497, 500 (2004) (explaining that the IRCA “depu-
tized” employers in the efforts to control immigration by requiring them to inquire re-
garding their employees immigration status). 
11 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2005); see, e.g., Gordon, supra note 1, 
at 51 (“[A]lthough the NLRA still technically covers undocumented workers, the usual 
remedies of reinstatement and back pay do not apply when employers retaliate against 
undocumented immigrants for their union support.”). The NLRA provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist la-
bor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the 
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such 
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) 
of this title. 
29 U.S.C. § 157. 
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the NLRA, the U.S. Supreme Court has severely restricted their ability 
to receive remedies for their employers’ labor violations.12
 Finally, the new emphasis in the American economy on service 
industry occupations calls into question the relevancy of the NLRA in 
the bulk of current workplaces.13 Typical unions base their strategies 
around a group of employees collectively bargaining with one large 
employer, such as a large manufacturer.14 This traditional method of 
protecting workers’ rights fails when applied to the smaller employers 
and diffused workplaces of the suburban service industry.15
 Against this bleak legal landscape, Gordon paints a surprisingly 
hopeful portrait of the efforts of the Workplace Project, a Long Island 
organization that she founded, as an example of how to address the 
problem of immigrants’ rights in the workplace.16 The Workplace 
Project is now comprised of and run by members from Central and 
South America who live and work on Long Island.17 The Workplace 
Project is a community-based organization that implements creative 
strategies to help employees, organized in small groups, improve their 
working conditions.18 The organization is dedicated to informing 
                                                   
12 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 140 
(2002) (holding that undocumented workers are entitled to the unionizing protections 
under the NLRA, yet their remedies for adverse employment actions are limited). 
13 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 1, at 53 (arguing that service work is a major aspect of 
the U.S. economy, yet is resistant to unionizing). Due to the shift in the U.S. economy, 
from manufacturing to service, unions need to reach out to the service industry in order 
to survive. Id. Gordon notes that, “[n]onmanufacturing—mostly service—work accounts 
for 67.8 percent of all work in the United States but only 38.8 percent of union member-
ship. Only 5.7 percent of service workers and a mere 4.4 percent of retail workers belong 
to a union.” Id. The service industry is difªcult to organize because of the lack of a clear 
employer with which to bargain, and the reality of the dominance of small employers in 
the service industry. Id. at 54. 
14 Katherine V. W. Stone, Employee Representation in the Boundaryless Workplace, 77 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 773, 797–98 (2002). Stone contends that the rights created by the NLRA no 
longer apply to current workplace conditions, since employees do not stay with one em-
ployer for their entire career, but rather move from job to job. Id. Under the NLRA, un-
ions exist only to represent employees when bargaining with a single employer. Id. Since 
employees today do not often have such long-term relationships with one employer, the 
function of the union under the NLRA is somewhat outdated. Id. 
15 See id. (stating that traditional notions of organizing do not match current employ-
ment practices); Julie Yates Rivchin, Note, Building Power Among Low-Wage Immigrant Work-
ers: Some Legal Considerations for Organizing Structures and Strategies, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 397, 411–13 (2004) (noting the disparity between the realities of service industry 
workers and the traditional union strategies of collective bargaining). 
16 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 68–69 (listing accomplishments that surpassed the 
worker’s expectations). “The Workplace Project refuses to accept that the newest and worst 
off immigrants are unorganizable.” Id. at 3. 
17 Id. at 70, 82. 
18 Id. at 81–82. The Workplace Project educates, provides legal services, and organizes 
Long Island immigrant workers, mostly Latinos, across many industries. Id. at 82. It took 
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immigrant workers about their rights as workers in the United States, 
and employs ºexible, experimental methods to address the needs of 
their working immigrant community through self-organizing, legal 
services and leadership training.19
 One of the ways in which the Workplace Project was able to better 
the lives of its members was by changing state law.20 Through their edu-
cational and organizing efforts, the Workplace Project realized the 
need to address the problem of employers cheating employees out of 
their wages, paying employees less than the minimum wage, and other 
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).21 The FLSA sets 
minimum wage requirements, provides for mandatory premium pay-
ments for overtime work, and prohibits various forms of child labor.22 
In the mid-1990s, however, the federal Department of Labor (DOL) 
had a policy of cooperating with immigration ofªcials who could de-
port workers.23 This made it risky for immigrant workers to even report 
their employers to the federal DOL.24 Since most undocumented im-
migrants were unable to gain the protections afforded them by federal 
law, they were left with only state laws and, in New York, the New York 
                                                                                                                      
inspiration from the worker center model, which is characterized by having a membership 
of employees and a focus on organization. Id. at 81. Worker centers differ from a union, 
where membership is based around employment with one employer in that worker centers 
accept all workers in a given community and examine workers’ roles as citizens and work-
ers. Stone, supra note 14, at 809. 
19 Gordon, supra note 1, at 68, 82. Some of these strategies include organizing day la-
borers; workers who are employed for the day to perform landscaping jobs and domestic 
workers. Id. at 69. 
In its ªrst ªve years, the Workplace Project and its immigrant leaders raised 
wages on Long Island day labor streetcorners by over 30 percent . . . created a 
domestic worker bill of rights and a model contract for domestic employers, 
and forced payment agencies to promise to adhere to them — a promise they 
sometimes kept. They founded a very small but successful worker-owned 
landscaping cooperative, and were planning for what would become a much 
larger housecleaning cooperative. 
Id. 
20 Gordon, supra note 1, at 241–42. 
21 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212 (2005) (setting federal 
minimum wage and maximum hours for covered employees and employers); see Gordon, 
supra note 1, at 240–41 (providing anecdotal examples of wage violations and the Depart-
ment of Labor’s slow response). Gordon explains that “the usual “ problems that the Work-
place Project saw were “scores of day laborers unpaid for a few days’ work, the dozens of 
domestic workers earning less than half the minimum wage, the array of injuries in land-
scaping and factories from speed-ups and lack of training.” Id. at 123. 
22 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. Undocumented workers are not excluded from the deªnition 
of “employees” under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
23 Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, 
& the Struggle for Social Change, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407, 419 (1995). 
24 Id. 
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State Department of Labor (NYDOL) to protect them from sub-
minimum wages.25 The Workplace Project found, however, that the 
NYDOL was inadequate in responding to the needs of immigrant 
workers.26 Therefore, the members of the Workplace Project decided 
to focus on enabling better enforcement of state laws through legisla-
tion.27
 Despite the fact that many of its members were not citizens, the 
Workplace Project effectively drafted and lobbied for a bill in the New 
York state legislature, the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act (UWPA).28 
The UWPA deterred employers from taking advantage of low-wage 
workers through increased penalties for employers engaged in unlaw-
ful practices and more stringent enforcement measures to facilitate a 
more effective response to immigrant workers.29 The toughest law of 
its kind in the nation, it provides for up to $20,000 in ªnes for em-
ployers who withhold wages from their employees and ªnds repeat 
offenders guilty of a felony, not just a misdemeanor offense.30
 Part I of this Book Review surveys the complex legal and societal 
landscape in which suburban sweatshops ºourish. Part II explores the 
organizing efforts of the Workplace Project to improve working con-
ditions for suburban sweatshop workers through the political process. 
Speciªcally, Part II will look at the Workplace Project’s role in drafting 
and lobbying for the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, a New York law 
that strengthened enforcement measures for unpaid wages. Part III 
analyzes the effectiveness of solving the suburban sweatshop crisis on 
the state level by looking at the UWPA’s impact on New York working 
conditions. Finally, this Book Review concludes there is hope for sub-
urban sweatshop workers since worker centers, which offer an alterna-
                                                   
25 Gordon, supra note 1, at 241 (describing New York state law regarding failure to pay 
wages as “weak — the maximum penalty for an employer who repeatedly or willfully failed 
to pay legal wages was a mere twenty–ªve percent on top of the total the employer owed; 
the crime of repeated nonpayment of wages was only a misdemeanor.”). 
26 Id. at 243. 
27 Id. at 241–42. 
28 Id. at 245, 260. 
29 Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, N.Y. Lab. Law § 198-a (1)–(3) (Consol. 1998); 
Gordon, supra note 1, at 107. The law increased civil ªnes for employers who do not pay 
their employees. Id. Under the former law, employers could be ªned up to twenty-ªve 
percent of what they owed their employees, while the UWPA allowed the DOL to ªne em-
ployers up to two-hundred percent of the withheld wages. Id. Additionally, the former law 
held that repeat offenders were guilty of a misdemeanor offense with a maximum penalty 
of $10,000. Id. The UWPA made repeat offenders guilty of a felony with a maximum 
$20,000 penalty. Id. 
30 N.Y. Lab. Law § 198-a (1); Fine, supra note 7, at 5. 
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tive to formal unions and collective bargaining, yield effective results 
on the state level. 
I. Obstacles to Organization 
 The United States’ laws present a number of barriers to immigrant 
workers striving to organize in today’s suburban sweatshops.31 The fed-
eral government’s policy, as articulated by the Congress and by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, effectively blocks undocumented immigrants from or-
ganizing to demand rights.32 Additionally, the structures of the indus-
tries in which many suburban immigrant workers are employed make 
using typical unionizing strategies difªcult or impossible.33
A. Legislation 
 Undocumented workers are not adequately protected by United 
States labor law.34 The National Labor Relations Act protects workers’ 
rights to engage in collective bargaining with their employers.35 The 
policy behind the NLRA was to deter unfair labor practices.36 Collective 
bargaining units, or unions, represent employees and negotiate with 
employers to gain better working conditions.37 Undocumented immi-
grants’ rights to collectively bargain are protected, since they are in-
cluded as “employees” under the NLRA.38 Nonetheless, undocumented 
                                                   
31 See, e.g., Fine, supra note 7, at 8 (stating both labor laws and immigration policy fail 
to protect low-wage immigrant workers); Gordon, supra note 1, at 51–57 (noting the in-
adequacies in the legal system and the difªculties of organizing in the service industry); 
Rivchin, supra note 15, at 400 (describing a historic union inability to organize immi-
grants). 
32 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 1, at 65 (referring to Hoffman Plastics and the NLRA’s 
detrimental impact on undocumented immigrants’ right to organize). 
33 Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-Wage Services, 
45 Rutgers L. Rev. 671, 672 (1993); Rivchin, supra note 15, at 411–12. 
34 Gordon, supra note 1, at 318 n.66. 
35 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2005) (protecting the rights of em-
ployees to organize, including bargaining collectively with their employer, without retalia-
tion by the employer). 
36 See, e.g., Michael Weiner, Comment, Can the NLRB Deter Unfair Labor Practices? Reas-
sessing the Punitive-Remedial Distinction in Labor Law Enforcement, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1579, 1619 
(2005) (“President Franklin Roosevelt noted: ‘By preventing practices which tend to de-
stroy the independence of labor, [the Act] seeks, for every worker within its scope, that 
freedom of choice and action which is justly his.’”). 
37 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 14, at 797–98 (discussing that once a union is certiªed by 
the National Labor Relations Board, they become obligated to fairly represent all employ-
ees in bargaining with the employer to form an agreement that will govern the terms and 
conditions of employment). 
38 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Under the NLRA, undocumented immigrants have been 
deemed “employees” for statutory purposes. Id; see Wishnie, supra note 10, at 501 (indicat-
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immigrants are inadequately protected under the law since the NLRA’s 
deªnition of “employee” does not cover those employees in many of 
the key industries in which immigrant workers labor.39 These forms of 
employment include agricultural workers, persons employed in domes-
tic service in a home, and independent contractors, including day la-
borers and janitors.40
 Compounding the problem of the lack of protection under labor 
law is the hostile posture of United States immigration law towards un-
documented workers.41 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 departed from previous immigration legislation and emphasized 
restricting employment of undocumented workers.42 Before the IRCA, 
American immigration policy, as established in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, focused on the movement of immigrants across 
the border, the admission, entry, harboring and transportation of ille-
gal immigrants, and was silent on issues of employment.43 The drafters 
of the IRCA believed that immigrants were entering this country ille-
gally because the immigrants thought it would be easy to obtain em-
                                                                                                                      
ing that the reasoning behind this deªnition of “employees” is well articulated by then-
Judge Anthony Kennedy’s statement, “[i]f the NLRA were inapplicable to workers who are 
illegal aliens, we would leave helpless the very persons who most need protection from 
exploitative employer practices.”). 
39 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see Rivchin, supra note 15, at 411 (remarking that the exclusion 
of these occupations is of concern to worker centers). 
40 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Some legal scholars contend these exemptions are due to “racial 
biases” in the law. Rivchin, supra note 15, at 400–01. According to Rivchin, “[t]he NLRA 
excluded from is protections workers in occupations dominated at the time by African-
Americans in a political compromise orchestrated to appease Southern politicians and 
maintain the racial dynamics of Southern socio-economic structures.” Id. 
41 Gordon, supra note 1, at 46, 51; Smith & Sugamori, supra note 4, at 8; Tallman, su-
pra note 3, at 872–73. 
42 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a). The 
other main objective was “grant[ing] amnesty to special agricultural workers who could 
prove they had been performing agricultural work in the United States for at least ninety 
days between May 1985 and May 1986 without proper documentation.” Ryan D. Frei, 
Comment, Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy in an Era of Latin American Immigration: The 
Logic Inherent in Accommodating the Inevitable, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1355, 1373 (2005). Since 
the IRCA, there have been two legislative acts that focused on immigration and addressed 
undocumented immigrants. Id. at 1373–74. First, the Immigration Act of 1990 made it 
easier to deport criminal aliens and increased the size of the border patrol. Immigration 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codiªed in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
Second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 em-
phasized efforts to strengthen border patrol. Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibil-
ity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codiªed in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
43 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181–1182, 1225 
(1952); Calderon-Barrera, supra note 8, at 120. 
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ployment.44 Therefore, if employers ceased to hire undocumented 
workers, undocumented immigrants would not come to the United 
States, since there would be no demand for them in the labor market.45 
The intent of Congress was not to decrease the rights of undocu-
mented workers in the labor force, but rather to destroy the incentive 
for undocumented immigrants to come to the United States. 46 Con-
gress understood that if they took the protections of the NLRA away 
from undocumented workers, they would be creating a class of workers 
who would be more attractive to employers since they would be unable 
to collectively bargain for their rights.47 This would depress the labor 
market for workers who did have the protections of the NLRA.48 In-
stead, Congress continued to afford undocumented immigrants protec-
tion from unscrupulous employers while furthering the employment 
policy of keeping undocumented workers out of the tight labor mar-
ket.49 Unfortunately, the resulting effect of the law has been to punish 
the employee more than the employer, realizing the fears of the law’s 
critics.50
                                                   
44 H.R. Rep. No. 99–682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986) (“Employment is the magnet that attracts 
aliens here illegally or, in the case of nonimmigrants, leads them to accept employment in 
violation of their status. Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation from 
hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from entering illegally or 
violating their status in search of employment.”). 
45 See id. at 47 (“Since most undocumented aliens enter this country to ªnd jobs, the 
[House Judiciary] Committee believes it is essential to require employers to share respon-
sibility to address this serious problem.”). 
46 See id. at 58 (“The employer sanctions provisions are not intended to limit in any way 
the scope of the term ‘employee’ in Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) . . . application of the NLRA ‘helps to assure that the wages and employment con-
ditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien 




50 See Nessel, supra note 9, at 361–62 (arguing that undocumented immigrants bear 
the brunt of the IRCA’s enforcement measures); Tallman, supra note 3, at 886 (stating that 
employer sanctions harm employees). For example, in Operation Vanguard, an attempt by 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to enforce the IRCA, the INS cooper-
ated with employers during reviews of their workplaces. Nessel, supra note 9, at 359–60. If 
the employers agreed to ªre the undocumented employees the INS found in their work-
force, no further action would be taken against the employer to punish them for violating 
the IRCA by employing undocumented workers. Id. This has the effect of further pushing 
undocumented immigrants into the underground economy where they are exploited. Id. 
at 60. Additionally, the INS had a policy of not conducting raids at employment sites where 
there are ongoing labor disputes. Wishnie, supra note 3, at 390. Nonetheless, “ªfty-ªve per-
cent of the workplaces raided by the INS in the sample were the subject of at least one for-
mal complaint to or investigation by a labor agency.” Id. at 392. 
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 The IRCA’s focus on labor issues weds employment and immigra-
tion laws in complex ways.51 The immigration agenda of the IRCA 
strives to protect American workers from competition with undocu-
mented workers by making it illegal for them to work in the United 
States.52 The status of undocumented immigrants as illegal workers 
raises questions about the extent to which the NLRA covers undocu-
mented workers.53 The judiciary is only now beginning to address 
these questions.54
B. Judicial Decisions 
 There have been only two U.S. Supreme Court cases that have ad-
dressed the status of undocumented immigrants under American labor 
laws: Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. 
N.L.R.B.55 Both cases involved the remedies available to undocumented 
workers for violations of the National Labor Relations Act.56 The court 
held that there was no question that undocumented workers are pro-
tected as “employees” under the NLRA.57 Nonetheless, these two cases 
reveal limitations when undocumented employees try to enforce these 
rights and obtain remedies for employer violations.58
 In Sure-Tan, the Supreme Court held that undocumented workers 
were not eligible for back pay under the NLRA, which is one of the 
primary remedies available for workers.59 This case involved an em-
                                                   
51 See Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichoto-
mies of Domestic Immigration & Labor Laws, 36 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 737, 765 (2003) (argu-
ing that although labor and immigration law are separate bodies of law, in reality, their 
effects are intertwined). 
52 H.R. Rep. No. 99–682, pt. i, at 58. 
53 Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders: IV. Legal Protections for Illegal Workers, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 2224, 2224–25 (2005) (noting, “[i]llegal workers, many of whom cross a 
border to ªnd a job, constitute a signiªcant part of American Society, as well as one of our 
largest classes of lawbreakers. . . . Because of their status as lawbreakers, however, illegal 
workers are difªcult for the law to protect.”) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. 
54 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) (holding 
that undocumented workers have only limited remedies under the NLRA and cannot re-
ceive back pay); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 892, 903 (1984) (holding that 
undocumented immigrants were “employees” as deªned under the NLRB, yet were not 
eligible for back pay). 
55 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149; Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892, 903; Wishnie, supra note 10, at 
498–99. 
56 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149; Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892, 903. 
57 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 144; Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892; see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (stating 
that the term “employee” shall include “any” employee). 
58 See Weiner, supra note 36, at 1595 (remarking on the court’s reluctance to grant un-
documented workers remedies for their employers’ violations of the NLRA). 
59 Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903; see Smith & Sugimori, supra note 4, at 45 (deªning back 
pay as payment of wages the worker would have earned if he or she had not been illegally 
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ployer at Sure-Tan, a leather tanning operation, who knowingly hired 
several illegal immigrants.60 When the workers attempted to unionize 
and were certiªed as a union by the NLRB, their employer reported 
them to the INS.61 The employees were deported as a result of the em-
ployer’s communications with immigration ofªcials.62 The Court rea-
soned that since the employee who brought the suit returned to Mex-
ico after losing his job at Sure-Tan, a back pay award for six months af-
ter the employee was ªred was speculative and not limited to the actual 
consequences of the employer’s actions.63 Additionally, the Court held 
that employees are unavailable for work and therefore are not entitled 
to back pay, if they are not lawfully working in the United States.64 Until 
the court decided Hoffman, it was unclear if this holding was to be in-
terpreted broadly, or if it was a fact-speciªc ruling.65
 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Hoffman provided guidance in 
answering this question, when a divided court ruled 5-4 that undocu-
mented workers were not eligible for back pay under the combined 
statutory scheme of the NLRA and IRCA.66 The Court held that un-
documented immigrant employees who had used fraudulent docu-
ments to obtain employment were not entitled to back pay under the 
terms of the IRCA if their employers violated the NRLA.67 The 
Court’s analysis rested on an interpretation of how the policy goals of 
the IRCA should interact with those of the NLRA.68 The majority rea-
soned that the employee’s use of fraudulent documents violated the 
                                                                                                                      
terminated). The Court found that the employer’s actions constituted an unfair labor 
practice in violation of the NLRA. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903. Since the workers were de-
ported, however, the Court found they were not available for work in the United States, 
and therefore were not entitled to back pay. Id. 
60 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 887 (1984). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 900 (stating that “a backpay remedy must be sufªciently tailored to expunge 
only the actual, and not merely speculative, consequences of the unfair labor practice.”). 
64 Id. at 903. 
65 Calderon-Barrera, supra note 8, at 125. Calderon-Barrera notes that the Court’s de-
cision leaves open the question of whether an undocumented worker who remains in the 
United States after being ªred in violation of the NLRA is considered available for work, 
and subsequently, eligible for back pay. Id. 
66 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). In this case 
workers who were involved in organizing a union were ªred by their employer. Id. After 
ªring one employee, Jose Castro, the employer learned at the NLRB proceedings that 
Castro was not authorized to work in the United States and had used false documents to 
obtain the job at Hoffman Plastic Compounds. Id. at 141. 
67 Id. at 149. 
68 Id. at 151–52; Calderon-Barrera, supra note 8, at 133. 
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express provisions of the IRCA.69 If the employee were to mitigate 
damages by ªnding new employment, as required under the NLRA, 
he or she would violate the IRCA by working in the U.S. through the 
use of forged documents, or would work for an employer who hired 
him or her illegally.70 Since it is impossible for an undocumented 
immigrant to obtain employment without acting against the IRCA, the 
court held that awarding back pay to undocumented workers for their 
employers’ NLRA violations runs counter to the IRCA.71
 The dissent by Justice Breyer, however, argued persuasively that 
the two policies must be viewed as interdependent.72 Breyer high-
lighted that in enforcing the NLRA’s policy of worker’s rights and 
awarding back pay to undocumented workers, the Court would further 
immigration policy by removing the incentive for employers to hire 
undocumented workers.73
 The Court’s decision in Hoffman has been widely criticized.74 Most 
critics are concerned that the Hoffman decision set a dangerous prece-
dent of downsizing undocumented immigrants’ rights.75 There is some 
                                                   
69 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(1)–(4) (1986) (making it a crime to used a forged, counterfeit, 
altered, falsely made document or a document lawfully issued to a person other than the 
possessor to get a job in the U.S.); Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148. 
70 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–51. 
71 Id. at 151. 
72 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 153 (2002) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that “the National Labor Relations Board’s limited backpay order 
will not interfere with the implementation of immigration policy. Rather, it reasonably 
helps to deter unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent”). 
73 Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer notes that denying the National La-
bor Relations Board the authority to award backpay to illegal aliens could have the effect 
of lowering the cost to the employer of labor law violations. Id. This, in turn, would in-
crease the employer’s incentive to hire undocumented immigrant workers and therefore 
increase the ºow of undocumented workers into the United States. Id. He also noted the 
danger of losing the deterrent power of the NLRA if the Board was unable to issue back 
pay to undocumented workers. Id. at 153–54. 
74 See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 2228–29 (noting that legal scholars 
argue that the Court did not properly balance the need to enforce immigration law and 
the need to protect immigrant workers, leaving open the possibility of further erosion of 
workers’ protections.); Wishnie, supra note 3, at 394 (“The Hoffman Plastic decision was 
wrongly decided. It will no doubt cause further exploitation of already-vulnerable immi-
grant workers, as well as an erosion of the terms and conditions of employment for those 
who compete with them in the labor market.”). 
75 See Ofªce of General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Memoran-
dum GC 02-06 C.1. (2002) (conªrming critics’ fears and reading Hoffman broadly). On the 
administrative level, the NLRB’s Ofªce of General Counsel Memorandum 02-06, takes a broad 
view of the Hoffman decision and says that regardless of the circumstances of their hire, 
undocumented immigrants are not eligible for back pay under the NLRA. Id. In federal 
courts, Florida and Kansas have used Hoffman to limit the protections available to un-
documented workers. See Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 
1998) (holding undocumented immigrants are not covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
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room for optimism, however, since some federal district courts have 
declined to extend Hoffman to cases involving employer violations of 
the FLSA.76 Additionally, growing numbers of the immigrant popula-
tion are ªnding employment outside of traditionally unionized ªelds, 
which lends hope to the prospect that there may be ways to circumvent 
the Hoffman ruling.77 Through tactics employed by organizations such 
as the Workplace Project, worker centers may be able to prevent the 
further erosion of rights for undocumented immigrant workers in to-
day’s suburban sweatshops.78
C. Structural Challenges 
 In addition to the harsh policies of the federal government re-
garding undocumented immigrant workers, these vulnerable workers 
must also deal with a breakdown in the effectiveness of typical union-
izing strategies.79 The worker protections of the NLRA are predicated 
on a model of collective bargaining that is not a realistic tool for many 
immigrant workers in the service industry.80 Gordon argues that most 
undocumented immigrant workers labor in the service industry, which 
                                                                                                                      
Act); Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2003) 
(ªnding that giving hurt workers lost wages under tort law would implicate the court in 
crime); Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. 01–1241, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19780, at *17 
(D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003) (holding that plaintiffs without work authorization cannot recover 
for future earnings in the United States). In New York state, federal courts are split on the 
issue of availability of back pay for undocumented workers under tort law. See Sanango v. 
200 E. 16th St. Hous. Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 314, 321 (App. Div. 2004) (holding the IRCA 
preempts undocumented workers from recovering compensation for lost wages in tort 
actions). But see Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817–18 (Sup. Ct. Richmond Co. 
2003) (holding undocumented immigrants are not precluded from seeking compensation 
for lost wages in tort actions). 
76 See Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464–65 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding discov-
ery of plaintiff’s immigration status was not relevant to her claim for back pay for unpaid 
wages under the FLSA, since the risk to the plaintiff was higher than the probative value); 
Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding 
discovery of plaintiff’s immigration status was not relevant for claims to recover lost wages 
under the FLSA); Smith & Sugimori, supra note 4, at 45–46 (noting the FLSA deªnes 
back pay as the payment of wages the employee earned, yet was not paid). 
77 Gordon, supra note 1, at 82. 
78 See id. (noting various tactics that the Workplace Project employed to help immi-
grant workers). 
79 Rivchin, supra note 15, at 411–12; Stone, supra note 14, at 798. Professor Stone notes 
that there has been a decline in union representation, which will exacerbate the problems 
of “income inequality and employment discrimination.” Id. at 788. 
80 Stone, supra note 14, at 786; Wial, supra note 33, at 678–79 (“Low-wage service jobs 
are characterized by high labor turnover, many temporary and part-time workers, and the 
absence of ªrm-speciªc internal labor markets. The absence of long-term attachments 
between low-wage service workers and particular employers makes the organization of 
these workers on an employer-speciªc basis . . . difªcult to begin and difªcult to sustain.”). 
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in many suburbs has become an underground economy.81 The un-
derground economy is marked by the mobile capital of small busi-
nesses, subcontractors, and factories, which can easily change names 
to evade the law, or are not covered under the laws.82 This business 
structure results in workplaces that are smaller, dispersed over broad 
geographic areas, marked by high labor turnover and temporary and 
part time workers, which makes collective bargaining with one em-
ployer difªcult.83 Additionally, the high number of recent immigrants 
in low-wage service jobs make it crucial that organizers be sensitive to 
the varied needs of their workers.84
 Organized labor’s next move needs to be the formulation of 
groups that can organize employees from various employers and 
across localities or even regions.85 Labor organizers’ newest challenge 
exists in organizing service-industry workers in a way that allows them 
to work outside of the legal framework of anti-immigrant policies such 
as those established in Hoffman.86 The Workplace Project is one of the 
few groups successful in overcoming these obstacles.87 One of their 
major achievements was the drafting and passage of the Unpaid 
Wages Prohibition Act, which helped suburban sweatshop workers 
                                                   
81 Gordon, supra note 23, at 412–13 (1995) (explaining that employers do not register 
with the proper authorities, do not comply with labor or tax laws, and often fail to partici-
pate in mandatory programs such as workers’ compensation and disability beneªts). 
82 Gordon, supra note 1, at 24, 48 (“It’s hard to organize someone who for all formal 
appearances doesn’t exist.”); Rivchin, supra note 15, at 411–12; Wial, supra note 33, at 678 
(“Service workers are employed at smaller and more geographically decentralized work-
sites than workers in manufacturing industries.”). 
83 Wial, supra note 33, at 678–79. 
84 Gordon, supra note 1, at 70 (some workers cannot speak English, fear deportation, 
see organizing as risky, and are from widely varying backgrounds); Wial, supra note 33, at 
677–78. 
85 Gordon, supra note 1, at 55; Wial, supra note 33, at 692; see Stone, supra note 14, at 
802 (arguing that in the new “boundaryless workplace,” the focus of organizing employees 
needs to be on factors other than a common employer). 
86 Wial, supra note 33, at 671; see Rivchin, supra note 15, at 416 (explaining that groups 
of workers excluded by the NLRA have been successful in organizing outside of the NLRA 
structure). 
87 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 61–66 (discussing various other successful low-wage 
immigrant advocacy organizations). Along with the Workplace Project, the Service Em-
ployees International Union’s (SEIU) Justice for Janitor’s campaign, was able to effectively 
work around the NLRA’s restrictions on secondary boycotts and gain support for un-
documented workers. Id. at 61–62. Bans on secondary boycotts make it difªcult to exert 
pressure on companies whose subcontractors do not comply with labor laws. Id. Since 
picketing these secondary employers is illegal, the SEIU has gained support from religious 
leaders, students, community organizations, and public ofªcials to make worker’s rights an 
issue in the community. Id. at 62. 
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receive the pay they earned.88 The Workplace Project’s ºexible and 
creative strategies were vital in changing a hostile legal climate for the 
beneªt of undocumented workers.89
II. Immigrants Circumvent Hoffman 
 After surveying the legislation, court decisions, and structural 
challenges undocumented workers face, it is clear that creative solu-
tions are required to address the problem of undocumented workers’ 
rights.90 Professor Katherine V.W. Stone exhorts labor organizations 
to “expand their focus upward into the political domain and outward 
into the community,” which is exactly how the Workplace Project be-
came successful.91 In 1995, the members of the Workplace Project, 
frustrated by the lack of enforcement of the New York state minimum 
wage laws, triumphed over employers who withheld workers’ wages by 
changing state law.92 The passage of the UWPA is an instructive ex-
ample of how a group of mainly immigrant workers—including un-
documented workers—effectuated change outside of the traditional 
union framework on the state level.93 The Workplace Project was able 
to improve working conditions for low-wage workers through active 
participation in the political process. 94
A. Organizing for Political Change 
 In 1995, members and staff of the Workplace Project were upset by 
the New York Department of Labor’s (NYDOL) slow processing of low-
wage workers’ claims for unpaid wages.95 They saw how the low penal-
ties for cheating employees out of their wages provided no deterrent to 
dishonest employers.96 They also realized a need for reform on the 
                                                   
88 See id. at 3 (the Workplace Project’s victories are the result of a “resourceful combi-
nation of collective action and legal advocacy”). 
89 Id. 
90 See id. at 69 (describing the many and varied experimental attempts made by the 
Workplace Project, other worker centers, and Unions in an effort to combat the problem 
of exploitation of undocumented workers). 
91 Stone, supra note 14, at 802. 
92 Jennifer Gordon, The Campaign for the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act: Latino Immigrants 
Change New York Wage Law, 4 Working Papers (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Wash-
ington D.C.), Sept. 1999, at 7, 9, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ªles/ 
imp_wp4gordon.pdf (the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act changed state law by providing 
stricter enforcement measures and trying to combat the ineffectiveness of the NYDOL). 
93 Gordon, supra note 1, at 238; Stone, supra note 14, at 815. 
94 Gordon, supra note 92, at 7. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 4. 
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agency level, since the NYDOL’s efforts were stymied by both under 
funding and prejudice against undocumented immigrants.97 Armed 
with ªrsthand knowledge, ªeld research, and a passion for change, the 
immigrants—including those without permission to work in the United 
States—committed to drafting and lobbying for a bill that would ad-
dress some of the problems with minimum wage law enforcement.98
 One reason for the Workplace Project’s success is their status as a 
worker center, and not a NLRB certiªed union.99 Worker centers are 
“organizing laboratories,” since one of their characteristics is a unique 
ability to brainstorm and implement new options for organizing.100 
Worker centers ºexibly address the needs of their members, and en-
gage in organizing efforts, such as the campaign for the UWPA, which 
fall outside of the collective bargaining model.101 Worker centers are 
valuable in providing an alternative to unions, since they can address 
issues of workplace rights on a larger scale than collectively bargaining 
with just one employer.102 This emphasis on broader change in labor 
law allows them to attract workers who are hard to organize, and work-
ers for whom traditional unions do not meet their needs.103 Even in a 
post-Hoffman climate, there is hope for organizing undocumented 
workers into effective groups that can advocate for stronger worker 
protections.104
                                                   
97 Id. at 3, 5–6. Gordon argues that one major problem with wage law enforcement is 
the under funding of the state and federal agencies meant to uphold the law. Id. at 3. This 
means that there are not enough inspectors to adequately monitor legitimate, registered 
businesses. Id. On Long Island, the Workplace Project gathered statistics that out of the 
seventy two claims they ªled with the NYDOL only three resulted in even partial payment 
to the employee. Id. at 5. Furthermore, NYDOL workers show their bias against advocating 
for undocumented workers with statements such as: “I don’t even take claims for house-
keepers for overtime . . . it’s a waste of time,” and “I don’t like to take claims for domestic 
workers and restaurant workers.” Id. 
98 See id. at 7 (discussing how the UWPA was initiated); Gordon, supra note 1, at 244–
45 (“Given that so many immigrant workers were paid less than the minimum, giving the 
law teeth would be an important victory.”). 
99 See Rivchin, supra note 15, at 415 (noting the advantage of worker centers over un-
ions). Rivchin notes that although the NLRA confers rights to groups of organized work-
ers, it also places restrictions on organizing activities, such as prohibiting secondary boy-
cotts. Id. at 410–13. Secondary boycotts are key in organizing heavily subcontracted indus-
tries and regulating picket activities. Id. 
100 Fine, supra note 7, at 9. 
101 See id. (discussing innovative strategies that worker centers developed and used). 
102 Rivchin, supra note 15, at 401. 
103 Fine, supra note 7, at 9. 
104 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 245–46 (noting that the members of the Workplace 
Project ªrst felt that their status as non-citizens would render them ineffectual in the po-
litical process, but soon learned that they could muster a strong political voice if they pre-
sented their bill in the correct light). 
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B. Mobilizing Undocumented Workers 
 Having undocumented immigrants lobby for the bill was a strate-
gic feat for the members of the Workplace Project.105 In May 1996, the 
Workplace Project had 420 members, approximately two percent were 
citizens, sixty–eight percent were noncitizen legal immigrants, and 
thirty percent were undocumented immigrants.106 Despite the risks, the 
Workplace Project decided to combine the forces of documented and 
undocumented workers.107 The Workplace Project members were able 
to do this because there was some protection in participating as a mem-
ber of a large group.108
 In campaigning for the UWPA, Workplace Project members met 
with legislators and persuaded them that unpaid wages was a problem 
of epidemic proportions on Long Island, which harmed not only un-
documented workers but also the public.109 In the anti-immigrant po-
litical climate of 1995 Long Island, the drafters of the UWPA made 
strategic alliances with businesses, community organizations, the me-
dia, and key politicians in order to pass their bill through the Repub-
lican Senate and the Democratic controlled Assembly.110 The workers 
framed their legislation to win Republican legislators’ votes by empha-
sizing key features.111 The campaigning members of the Workplace 
Project told Republican legislators that the UWPA focused on pre-
                                                   
105 See id. at 246 (describing the reluctance of many undocumented members of the 
Workplace Project to campaign for the UWPA); Gordon, supra note 92, at 22 (attributing 
the campaign’s success, in part, to the participation of undocumented workers who spoke 
directly with legislators). 
106 Gordon, supra note 1, at 245. 
107 Id. at 245–46. Undocumented members of the Workplace Project were fearful that 
engaging in a political campaign would expose their immigration status and make them 
easy targets for discriminatory ªring or even deportation. Id. Additionally, Workplace Pro-
ject member Juan Calderon highlights another reason workers were hesitant to campaign, 
“[i]f you’re not a citizen, how can you make demands? If I can’t vote, I’m no one. I’m in-
visible. How can I protest?” Id. 
108 See id. (stating “the sense that there will be some protection in doing this as a 
group, under the umbrella of the Workplace Project.”). 
109 Id. at 256; Gordon, supra note 92, at 26–27. Members of the Workplace Project 
campaign rehearsed what to emphasize to different legislators to showcase the most per-
suasive elements of the bill, and brainstormed answers to questions the legislators might 
ask. Id. at 26. The meetings took place in Spanish, and the legislators wore headphones 
that instantaneously translated the lobbyists’ words into English. Id. at 26–27. 
110 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 248, 256–68 (noting that Suffolk County, Long Island 
was in a heated “English-only” debate and describing the Workplace Project’s strategy: the 
process of lobbying, gathering public support for the bill, and the eventual passage of the 
bill in the New York legislature); Gordon, supra note 92, at 9–22 (detailing the political 
actions of the Workplace Project, and propounding four theories for why the legislators 
passed the bill into law). 
111Gordon, supra note 1, at 251; Gordon, supra note 92, at 8. 
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venting unfair competition by punishing employers who violate 
minimum wage laws, paying people the money they were owed as a 
way to keep them off of public beneªts, increasing state revenue by 
increasing ªnes, and funding the additional responsibilities the bill 
gives to the NYDOL through the ªnes it implements.112 Throughout 
the lobbying process, the members of the Workplace Project prepared 
how they would answer the legislator’s questions about immigration 
status, since even many documented workers were not citizens, and 
therefore were not part of the constituent group to which the legisla-
tors answered.113 Immigration status, however, never arose in the 
meetings with legislators.114
 One interesting limitation that the campaign illuminates is that it 
may not have been possible for a group of exclusively undocumented 
immigrants to pass this legislation on their own.115 This suggests that 
it is crucial for undocumented workers to organize in a way that com-
bines their forces with other low-wage workers in order to gain more 
protections under the law.116 This possible limitation, however, has 
not stopped immigrant groups from organizing to gain more worker 
protections for all immigrants.117
C. Successful Post-Hoffman Political Activism 
 Other examples of successful political campaigns organized by 
worker centers demonstrate how the principles motivating the Work-
place Project have been applied in a post-Hoffman political climate.118 
For example, Rhode Island’s United Workers Committee of Progreso 
Latino combined forces with religious, labor, and immigrant groups 
in Rhode Island to pass the Temporary Employment Protection Act.119 
                                                   
112 Gordon, supra note 92, at 8. 
113 Id. at 26. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 13 (explaining that if immigration status had become an issue in the cam-
paign, it may have been harder to gain support from legislators concerned with being seen 
pro-illegal alien). 
116 See id. (having a mixture of documented and undocumented immigrants may take 
the focus off of immigration status, and therefore help issues from becoming about help-
ing “illegal aliens”). 
117 See Wishnie, supra note 10, at 508 (remarking that many of the biggest issues of low-
wage immigrant workers are not exclusive to undocumented workers); supra text accompany-
ing note 87 (citing the SEIU as another example of creatively organizing around the NLRA.); 
infra notes 119, 121, 122 (discussing examples of successful organizing campaigns). 
118 See infra notes 119, 121, 122 (providing descriptions of immigrant groups who made 
positive changes in the law for undocumented immigrant workers). 
119 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.10 (2005); Maurice Emsellem & Catherine Ruckelshaus, 
Nat’l Employment Law Project, Organizing for Workplace Equity: Model State 
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The new law requires temporary agencies to give employees written 
notice of job descriptions, work schedules, and pay rates, so these 
employees are not abused by the temporary agency’s clients.120 Addi-
tionally, worker centers have successfully used the political process to 
lead local minimum and living wage campaigns across the nation.121 
Not all worker centers have focused their efforts on gaining rights for 
the undocumented population, but the success of these other worker 
centers combined with the success of the Workplace Project suggests 
that political advocacy through worker centers may be a powerful tool 
for advancing the rights of undocumented workers.122
 The success of worker centers in becoming effective political par-
ticipants lends optimism to the discussion of the downsizing of un-
documented workers’ rights.123 Despite the Workplace Project mem-
bers’ status as disenfranchised and undocumented they were able to 
make positive changes for low-wage undocumented workers.124 The 
success of passing the law is an important one, yet the next section will 
examine the UWPA’s impact on the daily lives of undocumented work-
ers after it became New York state law.125
III. States “Step into the Breach”126
 With the federal government taking a decidedly anti-immigrant 
stance, those who advocate for undocumented workers’ rights argue 
that change must be effected on a state level.127 Not all workers are cov-
                                                                                                                      
Legislation for “Nonstandard” Workers 22 (2000), available at http://www.nelp.org/ 
docUploads/pub17%2Epdf. 
120 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.10; Emsellem & Ruckelshaus, supra note 119, at 22; United 
Workers Committee, History and Evolution of the U.W.C., http://www.rictu.org/historia. 
html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
121 See Fine, supra note 7, at 16 (highlighting organizations such as the Baltimoreans 
United in Leadership Development (BUILD), which helped pass the ªrst living wage law 
in the nation). 
122 See id. at 9 (indicating that worker centers have “unprecedented success” in organiz-
ing low-wage immigrant workers, including large numbers of undocumented workers and 
provide a “central vehicle” for these employees to gain services, education, participate in 
civil society, and affect economic and political change). 
123 Id. at 25 (characterizing worker centers as “hopeful,” and “helping to set the politi-
cal agenda”); Gordon, supra note 92, at 37–38 (concluding that the campaign for the 
UWPA “contradicts our instinct that an effort to pass legislation led by noncitizen immi-
grants . . . would be a recipe for disaster”). 
124 See infra note 132 (describing the UWPA’s provisions regarding enforcement of 
minimum wage laws in New York state). 
125 See infra Part III.A. 
126 Smith & Sugimori, supra note 4, at 12. 
127 See id. (suggesting that state level authorities have a deeper understanding of what 
immigrant workers mean to their economy, a better awareness of the abuses immigrants 
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ered on the federal level, and states tend to provide more protections 
to undocumented workers.128 Additionally, local government may be in 
a better position to see the problems that the lack of protections for 
undocumented workers have on the entire community.129 This section 
will evaluate the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act (UWPA) and deter-
mine the effectiveness of organizing on the state level. 
A. Thinking Locally—The Burdens and Beneªts of State Changes 
 On the state level, advocates can help all workers, including un-
documented workers, by pressuring state agencies to adopt pro-
worker policies for enforcing current laws.130 For example, after the 
legislature passed the UWPA, unpaid low-wage workers, including un-
documented workers, found beneªts to the new law.131 The legislation 
the Workplace Project drafted focused on increasing penalties to de-
ter employers from violating minimum wage law, and ªxing the slow 
turn around for NYDOL managed employee claims.132 The bill also 
shifted the burden of proof to the employer to show payment of 
wages when the employer did not keep adequate records, required 
workers to be informed of the process of their claim periodically, and 
allowed labor unions to ªle wage claims on behalf of their mem-
bers.133
                                                                                                                      
suffer, and feel a sense of duty to protect all local residents); Nat’l Employment Law 
Project, A Survey of State Wage Enforcement Laws: Models for Successful Re-
form 1 (1997), available at http://www.nelp.org/publications.cfm?section=\iwp\ (arguing 
that the inadequacies in federal law in covering certain industries and job classiªcations 
and the inability of the DOL to enforce labor and immigration law requires strict state 
penalties). 
128 Gordon, supra note 92, at 39 n.8 (noting that employees that do not put goods into 
the stream of interstate commerce and have less than ªve hundred thousand dollars in 
gross revenues a year are not covered by the FLSA). 
129 Smith & Sugimori, supra note 4, at 12. 
130 Id. at 47–48 (noting that such policies are needed to make states reafªrm their 
commitment to enforcing all laws, without taking into account workers’ immigration 
status). After Hoffman, California and Washington have adopted policies that protect un-
documented workers’ rights to back pay and workers compensation, respectively. Id. 
131 Gordon, supra note 92, at 31. 
132 Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, § 198-a (1) (1998) (increasing penalties for em-
ployers who fail to pay their workers). Speciªcally, the ªnal version of the Act included 
provisions increasing the civil penalty for repeatedly or willfully not paying wages from 
twenty-ªve to two hundred percent of the amount owed, turning nonpayment into a felony 
offense, requiring the NYDOL to go back the full six years permitted by law in their inves-
tigations of employer conduct, and not allowing settlements of less than one hundred 
percent without the employee’s permission. Gordon, supra note 92, at 7. 
133 §§ 196-a, 199-a; Gordon supra note 92, at 7–8. 
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 Although difªcult to quantify, the UWPA furthered the Work-
place Project’s goal of deterring employers from violating existing 
minimum wage laws.134 After passage, the Workplace Project alone 
worked with forty–four percent more workers than the previous year, 
and recovered a record amount of unpaid wages.135 Gordon notes 
that employers were spurred to settle by simply receiving a letter in-
forming them that they could face a ªne of up to two–hundred per-
cent of what they owed.136 Other advocacy groups used the UWPA as a 
tool to gain unpaid wages for workers of all types in New York.137 Ad-
ditionally, a low-wage worker successfully brought a claim for unpaid 
wages under the burden shifting provision of the law when his em-
ployer failed to keep adequate payment records.138
 By some measures, however, the UWPA was not successful.139 Al-
though there were a number of positive changes resulting from the 
new law, these changes have not led to a substantial increase in the 
amount of wages the NYDOL recovers for low-wage workers.140 Gordon 
attributes the problems with the Act’s use at the NYDOL to a number 
of factors, including a lack of funds generated by the Act, no provi-
sions to force the NYDOL to change their tactics, and the Workplace 
Project’s decreased organizing and advocacy work for the law’s im-
plementation.141 Despite the problems of the UWPA, it is vital to en-
force the state minimum wage laws, and judging by the number of 
other states who have passed similar legislation, it was persuasive in 
effecting change nationally.142
                                                   
134 Gordon supra note 92, at 30. 
135 Id. at 30–31. 
136 Id. at 30. 
137 Id. at 31 (explaining the Local 802 of the American Federation of Musicians’ use of 
the Act to recover unpaid wages). 
138 Angello v. Nat’l Fin. Corp., 769 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69–70 (App. Div. 2003). In Angello, the 
plaintiffs alleged that their employer, the National Finance Corporation, failed to pay 
them their earned wages and certain wage supplements. Id. at 67. The employer failed to 
keep adequate records of the wages paid to the plaintiffs. Id. The court held that, in wage 
claims cases, where the employer did not submit proof contradicting the claims made by 
employees, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show payment of wages. Id. at 69–
70. 
139 Gordon, supra note 92, at 31. 
140 Id. The NYDOL hired a full-time Spanish-speaking investigator for their Hemp-
stead, New York ofªce, developed Spanish versions of forms, and began to process cases 
more quickly through the use of a new, more efªcient docketing system. Id. Nonetheless, 
once the DOL was “out of the spotlight” their efforts to punish employees to the full ex-
tent of the law decreased markedly. Id. 
141 Id. at 32. Ironically, these measures were some of the very measures that helped the 
bill pass the legislature. Id. 
142 See generally State Laws Creating Criminal Penalties for Failure to Pay Wages 
(2004) available at http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/criminal%20penalties% 20for%20un- 
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 One way to affect more sweeping changes may be to focus energy 
on addressing the problem at a national level.143 There are some 
ºedgling national efforts for immigration and employment law re-
form, but most of the campaigns of worker centers focus on changing 
conditions within their states.144 These national efforts to unite 
worker centers and create political change on a federal level are 
promising yet underfunded organizations.145 Many advocates still 
think the efforts of groups with little political power and a lack of 
funding are better focused on the state level.146 Working to affect 
change at the state level can have a big impact on all workers, since 
state laws apply to more workers than federal laws.147 Additionally, 
there may be more opportunity to affect change on the state level for 
groups like the Workplace Project, who lack the political power and 
membership base to advocate for change on a national level.148 Once 
one state makes a change, and other states see that it works, they may 
be more willing to follow suit.149 Finally, there is the idea that the 
states are laboratories for justice, and if a number of states adopt poli-
cies that enforce current laws or expand rights for undocumented 
workers, the federal government may be more willing to follow their 
                                                                                                                      
 paid%20wages%2Epdf (outlining criminal penalties under state laws for failure to pay 
wages) [hereinafter State Criminal Penalties]. 
143 Fine, supra note 7, at 11. 
144 Id. at 16 (citing the Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride as a national rally for immi-
grant rights that resulted in the Fair Immigration Reform Movement as one example of a 
national movement gaining momentum). 
145 See id. at 11 (discussing the isolation and difªculty in building coalitions to affect 
political change on state and national levels as a weakness of worker centers). 
146 Smith & Sugimori, supra note 4, at 47. 
147 See id. at 12 (stating that state laws provide stronger protections for undocumented 
workers than federal law). 
148 Fine, supra note 7, at 11 (noting that the small and isolated status of worker centers 
does not foster networking between centers which would help aggregate power and apply 
more persuasive pressure to opponents of low-wage workers’ rights). 
149 See generally State Criminal Penalties, supra note 142 (listing the various state 
laws regarding failure to pay wages). After the Workplace Project passed the UWPA, other 
states increased their enforcement measures for employees who did not pay their workers. 
Fine, supra note 7, at 11. After the BUILD campaign for a living wage, seventy other locali-
ties passed living wage ordinances. Living Wage Facts at a Glance, Economic Policy Insti-
tute, http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/issueguides_livingwage_livingwagefacts (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2006). 
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lead.150 Overall, state legislation is an important and rewarding ave-
nue for protecting undocumented workers’ rights.151
C. Looking Beyond Long Island 
 While the Workplace Project provides a successful example of 
advocating for legislative change on behalf of undocumented low-
wage workers in New York, it was the result of a unique set of circum-
stances that may prove difªcult to replicate.152 First, the bill was self-
funding and thus, did not require increased state funding.153 The sec-
ond factor was unique to the political climate of New York in 1995.154 
Republicans in the Senate recognized a need to send bills to Gover-
nor Pataki, a fellow Republican, which would make him look sympa-
thetic to the working class.155 Additionally, the large numbers of La-
tino immigrants were more of a political force on Long Island than 
they may be in many communities.156 While some of these factors are 
easier than others to duplicate, the conºuence of all of them greatly 
aided the passage of the UWPA, and give reason to question the 
chances for other immigrant worker groups to succeed.157
                                                   
150 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the 
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
151 Id.; see Fine, supra note 7, at 16 (while there are a few national efforts to organize 
workers, worker centers have found state level action to be a more rewarding avenue for 
advocacy). 
152 See Gordon, supra note 92, at 11 (listing the factors Gordon attributes to the success 
of the campaign for the UWPA). Gordon explains that “power in the legislative system is 
seen to come from two sources: either votes or money. And conventionally, immigrant 
workers are thought to wield neither.” Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. Gordon suggests four factors which may have prevented the traditionally anti-
immigrant and anti-worker Republican party in New York from viewing the UWPA as a 
threat. Id. First, the Republicans were looking to gain support from the growing Latino 
population in upcoming elections. Id. Second, the powerful political allies in the business 
world that the campaign attracted shifted the focus away from the “immigrant question.” 
Id. Third, the Workplace Project’s message and effective use of the media made it difªcult 
for legislators to oppose the UWPA without looking like they supported “bad employers.” 
Id. Finally, Gordon suggests that the moral strength of the arguments and personal stories 
of the immigrant lobbyists persuaded the legislature. Id. 
156 See id. (noting the possibility that Republicans supported the UWPA because of the 
growing political inºuence of Latinos on Long Island). 
157 Gordon, supra note 92, at 37. Gordon explains that the legislation’s message of 
“hard work and the right to be paid for it” was beneªcial, since it emphasized the immi-
grant workers’ role as exploited workers. Id. This message is not easy to duplicate in cam-
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 Despite this possibly unique set of circumstances, the UWPA dem-
onstrates that efforts to pass legislation by noncitizens are not always 
doomed for failure.158 A number of other immigrant organizations 
have achieved state and local political change.159 Omaha Together One 
Community, for example, successfully campaigned for the adoption of 
a “Workers Bill of Rights” for mostly Mexican exploited workers in the 
meatpacking industry, which guaranteed the right to organize.160 The 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) has met with success in 
organizing home health aides in southern California, despite the fact 
that these workers were spread out among thousands of private 
homes.161 The SEIU advanced workers’ rights by not only organizing 
workers, but by also effecting a change in the law.162 The law created 
public authorities as the employer of record, with whom the union 
could bargain.163 These successes suggest that organizing for state and 
local change is a viable option for immigrant groups who are working 
in a post-Hoffman political landscape and are looking to increase un-
documented worker protections.164 The applicability of strategies simi-
lar to that of the Workplace Project lends hope to the picture of the 
future of undocumented immigrants in the United States.165
                                                                                                                      
paigns to preserve beneªts, and increase protections speciªcally for immigrants, which 
tend to cast immigrants in the light of “takers.” Id. 
158 Id. at 38. 
159 See Fine, supra note 7, at 13, 16 (discussing the work of Omaha Together One 
Community in the meatpacking industry); Gordon, supra note 1, at 63 (describing the 
SEIU’s decade-long efforts to organize home health aides in California, which resulted in 
the government creating an entity with which the union could collectively bargain); supra 
note 119 (detailing the work of Rhode Island’s United Workers Committee of Progreso 
Latino). 
160 Fine, supra note 7, at 13, 16. 
161 Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in California: An Analysis of a 
Successful Strategy, 27 Lab. Stud. J. 1, 4 (2002); Gordon, supra note 1, at 63. 
162 Delp & Quan, supra note 161, at 8; Gordon, supra note 1, at 63. 
163 S.B. 35, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993); S.B. 1078, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
1993); S.B. 485, 1992 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992); Delp & Quan, supra note 161, at 9; 
Gordon, supra note 1, at 63. 
164 Amy Sugimori et al., Assessing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB on Immigrant Workers and Recent Devel-
opments 6 (2002), available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ Hoffman_NLRB/ 
Hoffman_NELP_NILC_FINAL.PDF (arguing that it is likely that state courts will continue 
to limit the Hoffman ruling by not applying it to undocumented workers’ remedies under 
state employment and labor law). Since states may make their own policy decisions about 
the remedies available to undocumented immigrants, advocates may be more successful in 
petitioning for change on the state level. Id. at 7. 
165 Gordon, supra note 92, at 38 (remarking that “the conditions that allowed the cam-
paign for the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act to ºourish and succeed are far from unique. 
Through community-based organizing institutions, immigrant leaders have the opportu-
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Conclusion 
 The failure of unions to formulate successful strategies for organiz-
ing low-wage immigrant workers combined with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hoffman, which severely limited undocumented workers’ 
right to remedies, seems like an insurmountable obstacle for suburban 
sweatshop workers.166 The Workplace Project’s successful campaign to 
improve the lives of suburban sweatshop workers through state legisla-
tion, however, provides a glimmer of hope in an altogether bleak legal 
and social landscape.167 While the Workplace Project is conscious of 
their limitations, they understand that they have found successful 
strategies in the model of the worker center and in political activism on 
the state level.168 Despite the fact that suburban sweatshop workers face 
an uphill battle to improve their working conditions, the opportunity 
for undocumented immigrants to organize and engage in the political 
process is empowering for laborers in suburban sweatshops.169 If tactics 
of geographic organization and state level political activism are pur-
sued, this may provide a way for undocumented immigrants to organize 
outside of the typical union framework and around the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hoffman.170
                                                                                                                      
nity to identify and attack the problems that their communities face . . . [and] can win 
victories that would surprise the staunchest cynic.”). 
166 See supra Part I.A.–B. (explaining the legislative and judicial factors which limit sub-
urban sweatshop workers’ rights). 
167 See Gordon, supra note 88, at 38 (concluding that the UWPA’s passage sends a mes-
sage of strength and optimism to other worker centers). 
168 See Gordon, supra note 1, at 108 (noting that the Workplace Project has not been 
effective in permanently raising the wages of low-wage workers). As member and organizer 
Carlos Canales said, “I feel like right now we are on the tip of an iceberg. The Workplace 
Project is a tiny ant, with a tiny ant’s needle, trying to break that iceberg down.” Id. at 302. 
Yet, Gordon notes, “[w]ith such small victories, the omnipresent and overwhelming sense 
of powerlessness . . . may begin—just begin—to dissolve.” Id. 
169 Id. at 302. In the words of Workplace Project member Zoila Rodriguez, “[p]erhaps 
they will ªre me for raising my voice or demanding something, but they won’t have ªred 
me with my mouth closed. I will have stood up for myself.” Id. at 80. 
170 See Rivchin, supra note 15, at 430. 
Hoffman Plastic may be seen as a setback to organizing immigrant workers and 
to the labor movement as a whole; yet, it can also be viewed as a call to action 
to galvanize organizing efforts. While viewing Hoffman’s restrictions on reme-
dies for labor violations as a potential obstacle to organizing, we should also 
consider that organizing under labor law has always faced multiple con-
straints. . . . The examples of workers who have organized outside of the 
NLRB model pose alternatives to traditional union organizing and in turn 
may suggest the limitations of Hoffman’s impact. 
Id. 
